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This  paper  experimentally  investigates  how  leaders  and  followers  in  a  duopoly  set 
prices for two product markets that have different overhead costs. In a fully crossed 
two-by-two design, we manipulate the participants’ private cost report quality as either 
low or high, representing the extent to which these reports reveal that product markets 
have  different  overhead costs. We  show  that  when  only  the  leader  is given  a  high-
quality cost report, private cost information of higher quality is better incorporated into 
market prices (that are observable to participants). Both the leader and follower improve 
in profits and their prices better reflect the differences in overhead costs because the 
follower infers information from the leader’s prices (information leakage). In contrast, 
when  only  the  follower  receives  a  high-quality  cost  report,  the  leader’s  profits  and 
prices do not improve. This occurs because the follower conceals cost information when 
the leader has a low-quality cost report.  
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1. Introduction 
This  study  examines  how  a  leader  (first  mover)  and  a  follower  (second  mover) 
respond to cost report quality, when they set prices for two product markets that vary in 
the amount of overhead or indirect product costs utilized. Textbooks often claim that 
cost  reports  that  capture  the  differences  in  overhead  costs  across  a  firm’s  product-
markets with less distortion, can improve the firm’s profits and price setting (Kaplan 
and Cooper [1998]). While this assumption is reasonable for a monopolist (Narayanan 
[2003]), such a conclusion is less obvious in a competitive context. In a competitive 
setting,  if  price  information  reveals  a  firm’s  private  cost  information  to  other 
participants (‘information leakage’), this may mitigate the potential advantage of the 
firm using the high-quality cost report.  
We presume that the amount of private cost information that is revealed through 
market prices is strongly affected by the way private cost reports are distributed to firms 
in a duopoly. Specifically, we propose that more private cost information leaks out to 
the  market  if  only  the  leader  rather  than  the  follower  holds  a  cost  report  of  higher 
quality. To test this claim, we use a fully-crossed two-by-two experimental design and 
manipulate the quality of the player’s private cost reports as either having low or high 
quality
1. A high-quality cost report better reflects the actual variation in the overhead 
costs consumed by the two product markets (per unit of volume). A low-quality cost 
report provides a distorted cost signal given that the overhead costs are the same for the 
two product markets (per unit of volume). We further disclose the players’ total realized 
profits and their prices for the two product markets after each round of play. 
Our results provide important insights into the market effects of price disclosures 
(Biddle and Hilary [2006]) as we show the conditions under which prices better reflect 
                                                   
1  We focus on the two treatments in which only one agent (either the leader or the follower) uses a high-
quality cost report. We contrast these against the two settings in which both agents receive cost reports 
of the same quality (both use a low or both use a high-quality cost report).   2 
private cost information. Specifically, a market is defined as signal efficient with respect 
to a high-quality cost report, if prices and profits are similar to those that would be 
achieved if all agents had direct access to the high-quality cost report (Beaver [1991], 
Bloomfield and Libby [1996]). We show that signal efficiency is achieved, when only a 
leader uses a high-quality cost report. Followers using a low-quality cost report infer 
information from the leader’s prices (information leakage) and all participants’ prices 
and profits are similar than in the case where both leader and follower use a high-quality 
cost report. Signal efficiency is much lower when only followers hold the high-quality 
report. In this case, followers conceal their cost information to take advantage of leaders 
who use a low-quality cost report. As a result, prices of all participants reflect to a lesser 
extent the differences in overhead costs between the two product markets. The leader’s 
profits are also lower than in the treatment where all agents use a high-quality report.  
This  study  also  questions  the  common  argument  that  cost-related  pricing  errors 
disappear quickly through market feedback from more successful players (Kachelmeier 
[1996], Waller et al. [1999]) or from better-informed players in a market (Briers et al. 
[1999]). In our setting such pricing errors still persist if only the follower is given a 
high-quality cost report. In this case, leaders with a low-quality cost report do not adjust 
their prices between the two product markets to reflect the differences in indirect costs. 
Leaders make similar pricing errors than in the case where all players use a low-quality 
cost report. Conversely, we find that pricing errors of followers using a low-quality cost 
report quickly disappear when only the leader receives a high-quality cost report. Both 
leaders’ and followers’ prices reflect the differences in overhead costs, and both players 
improve their profits (compared to when all agents receive cost reports of low-quality).  
Although we use a market with imperfect competition, a bit similar to Bloomfield 
and Luft [2006], our results qualify their view that participants in such markets have   3 
more difficulty in avoiding cost-related pricing errors.
2 We contribute to this study in 
two important ways: 1) pricing errors can still quickly disappear or persist depending on 
who holds the high-quality cost report; and 2) this result is not driven by psychological 
factors, but by different forms of competitive behavior that arise when followers are 
given a high-quality report compared to when leaders are given a high-quality report. 
Our findings suggest practical consequences for firms that want to invest in costing 
systems that better reflect differences in overhead costs when their competitors rely on 
systems that do not provide this information. Contrary to general intuition (Kaplan and 
Cooper [1998], Vives [1984; 1990]), a leader does not achieve superior profits vis-à-vis 
a follower, if only the leader uses a high-quality cost report (due to information leakage 
from a leader to a follower). Analyses also show that if only a follower is given a high- 
quality report, this follower performs worse (as he or she conceals cost information) 
than a follower with a low-quality report who faces a leader with a high-quality report. 
 
2. Framework and hypotheses   
The accounting literature has focused solely on competitions in which participants make 
simultaneous pricing decisions (Kachelmeier [1996], Waller et al. [1999], Bloomfield 
and Luft [2006]). In a sequential game, however, followers that move second have the 
advantage of observing the pricing decisions of a leader before markets clear and prices 
and profit information become available to all parties. Although such games are quite 
common, they have received little investigation (Huck et al. [2001]). We are the first to 
examine the impact on prices and profits of the quality of private cost information about 
the indirect product costs. The key question that we explore is how well market prices 
                                                   
2 If markets are very competitive, the threat of being priced out of the market (Waller et al. [1999]) or of 
losing bids when there are bids and asks of buyers and sellers coming together (Kachelmeier [1996]) 
quickly disciplines these errors. We employ an imperfect duopoly where players would not lose all sales 
to their rivals if they set different prices than their competitor (Mishra and Vaysman [2001]) and similar 
to Bloomfield and Luft [2006], we do not have any interactions with buyers.   4 
reflect private cost information of higher quality (that better captures the differences in 
overhead costs between product markets) if only the leader or only the follower is given 
such  information.  If  indirect  costs  differ  sharply  between  markets,  participants  can 
improve their profits when prices in the two markets differ accordingly. However, when 
prices are observable, acting on a high-quality cost report by setting different prices in 
the two markets may convey cost information to the other participant (Milgrom and 
Roberts [1987], Narayanan [2003]). This is called information leakage (Goenka [2003]). 
We use a design in which we focus on the two treatments where only the leader is 
given a high-quality cost report (and the follower uses a low-quality cost report) or the 
follower is given a high-quality report (and the leader uses a low-quality cost report). 
We contrast these to the first benchmark in which both agents are given low-quality cost 
reports (i.e. reports that indicate little difference in the indirect costs of the two product 
markets). In this case, there are cost-related pricing errors as the participants’ prices are 
unlikely to reflect the actual differences in indirect costs. From this, we can see how 
much participants improve their prices and profits when only the leader or the follower 
is given a high-quality report. In the second benchmark both agents receive high-quality 
cost reports. To explore signal-efficiency, we compare this second benchmark to the 
agents’ prices and profits under conditions when only the leader or only the follower 
uses a high-quality cost report (Beaver [1991], Bloomfield and Libby [1996]).  
We then predict that there is more information leakage when only the leader uses a 
high-quality cost report. Similar leakage does not occur when only the follower receives 
a  high-quality  cost  report.  This  happens  because  a  follower  uses  his  second  mover 
advantage differently dependent on whether or not he or she receives a high-quality cost 
report. Specifically, in a repeated pricing context (Matsui [1989]), leaders or followers 
can make their actions dependent on what they observe. If we presume that participants   5 
act on the basis of their cost reports in the initial phases of play (Waller et al. [1999], 
Gupta and King [1997]), a leader will adjust prices in the two markets in response to a 
high-quality cost report that shows the differences in indirect unit costs, but will set the 
same price in both markets given a low-quality cost report. When only the leader has a 
high-quality report, the follower quickly observes that the leader attains higher profits 
when he set different prices in the two product markets. A follower with a low-quality 
cost  report  can  then  simply  decide  to  copy  the  leader  in  the  next  rounds  of  play. 
Consistent with Oechssler [2002] and Huck et al. [2001], imitation is likely because 
followers with a low-quality cost report can then attain similar profits to the leader.  
Conversely, if only a follower receives a high-quality cost report, we predict a more 
aggressive game. Since followers make their pricing decisions after observing a leader’s 
prices (Gal-or [1985]), followers can use their high-quality cost report to outperform 
leaders who receive a low-quality cost report. In each round, a follower can always 
adjust prices more than the leader in order to improve their profits at the expense of the 
leader’s profit. The follower, however, faces an important dilemma in that exploitation 
can trigger retaliation by the leader (Martini [2003], Dixon et al. [2002]). One way for 
leaders  to  retaliate  is  to react  with  prices  that  do  not  differ  at  all  between  the  two 
markets  (consistent  with  the  low-quality  cost  report  received  by  the  leader).  This 
reduces the profits of all players, even the profits of the follower, because total market 
profits would in fact be higher if all participants’ prices incorporate the differences in 
the indirect costs. There are, however, motivations for followers to control the amount 
of  cost  information  revealed  via  market  prices  (Gal-Or  [1987]).
3  First,  when  the 
follower’s prices are only slightly different in the two markets and exploit the prices of 
                                                   
3 We can make an analogy to the situation described in Gal-Or [1987], where leaders hold a theoretical 
first-mover advantage in a quantity competition. She describes how reduced benefits can occur for a 
leader that has superior private information about the demand function. Leaders also hold back demand 
information  in  the  first  round  to  influence  the  second  round  of  play.  Nevertheless,  Gal-Or  [1987] 
analytically proves that having access to private information is then no longer beneficial.   6 
a leader to a lower extent, leaders may be more inclined to correctly adjust their prices 
in further rounds. As a result, followers’ profits may be higher than in the case when the 
leader retaliates by maintaining the same price for both product markets. Secondly, if a 
leader  would  retaliate,  followers  can  try  in  later  rounds  to  force  the  leader  to  set 
different  prices  in  the  two  markets  (Selten  et  al.  [1997],  Selten  [1998],  Cason  and 
Mason [1989]) by setting the same price in both markets for at least one round. In both 
cases, of course, market prices incorporate cost information more slowly.  
The above arguments suggest that a follower with a low-quality cost report can infer 
cost information from the leader’s prices when the leader has a high-quality cost report. 
In hypothesis 1, we therefore predict that quality of the cost report will be less important 
for followers if the leader already uses a high-quality report (an interaction that shows 
that leader’s information leaks to the market). Conversely, leaders with a low-quality 
cost report do not infer information from a follower with a high-quality report because a 
follower conceals part of the cost information. The leader may even continue to set 
prices that do not reflect the differences in overhead costs. Therefore, the leader is less 
likely to improve when a follower is given a high-quality report. Hence, we predict in 
hypothesis 2 that the leader only improves when he or she is given a high-quality report.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Providing the follower with a high-quality cost report improves the 
follower’s profit and prices less, when a leader already has a high-quality cost report. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Providing the leader with a high-quality cost report improves the 
leader’s profit and prices, regardless the type of cost report of the follower. 
 
Support for the hypotheses would mean that providing only the leader with a high-
quality cost report instead of providing only the follower with such a report will 1) more 
sharply improve both participants’ profits and prices compared to the scenario in which   7 
both leader and follower use low-quality cost reports; 2) improve signal efficiency more 
in the sense that prices and profits are then likely to be similar to those achieved when 
all participants have high-quality reports (due to information leakage from leaders). 
 
3. Experimental design 
Fifty-eight fixed pairs of participants compete in 10 rounds of pricing decisions for two 
product  markets  that  have  similar  direct  costs  but  very  different indirect  costs.
4 We 
randomly assign participants in each pair to the role of a leader (first mover) or follower 
(second mover who decides after a leader). After each round, total profits and prices per 
product  market  are  made  public  and  the  participants  review  a  private  cost  report 
regarding their own performance. Before the participants begin, they also review their 
cost report and the rival’s profit and prices per product market for initial prices set by 
the researcher. In a fully crossed two-by-two between-subjects design, we assign either 
‘high’ or ‘low’ quality to the participants’ cost reports. A high-quality cost report better 
reflects the differences in indirect costs between the two markets. In contrast, a low-
quality cost report indicates that the indirect costs per unit of volume are similar in both 
markets. We first discuss the demand and cost functions of the two product markets. 
Section 3.2 explains the cost report manipulation. Section 3.3 describes the procedures 
and our participants. Manipulation checks are discussed in Section 3.4.  
 
3.1. THE MODEL: PRICE COMPETITION IN MARKETS WITH DIFFERENT INDIRECT COSTS 
We employ a von Stackelberg price competition in two product markets, A and B 
that differ in terms of indirect costs (indices ‘a’ and ‘b’ represent markets A and B). As a 
result of these cost differences, profits increase if the prices in the two product markets, 
respectively Pa and Pb, are set differently. Followers have a second-mover advantage in 
                                                   
4 Fixed pairs (Huck et al. [2001]) are commonly used if one is interested in behavior in a repeated play.    8 
that they make their pricing decision after they observe the leader’s prices. Below, we 
show the product demand and cost functions. Subscripts L and F index the leader and 
follower, respectively. For followers one should use the indices in parentheses.  
Equations (1a) and (1b) show that we employ a differentiated demand function, Q, 
to represent sales volume in each market: Typically, a participant’s own price in each 
product market affects sales volume to a greater extent than does a rival’s price (e.g., 
Callahan and Gabriel [1998]). Examples are product markets in which similar products 
have different brand names. Total demand for each participant, Qtot, is given in (1c).   
Sales volume market A:  Qa L (F)  = 5500 – 3.00 Pa L (F)  + 1.05 Pa F (L)       (1a) 
Sales volume market B:  Qb L (F)  = 2325 – 1.25 Pa L (F)  + 0.30 Pb F (L)         (1b) 
Total sales volume:    Qtot L (F)  =  Qa L (F)  + Qb L (F)          (1c) 
Both leaders and followers face the same cost structure. In each market we use a 
simple function representing the direct cost of goods sold, C (equations 2a, 2b, and 2c). 
A complex function represents the indirect costs or overhead costs, OH (equations 3a, 
3b, and 3c). Product market A incurs much more overhead costs per unit of volume, 
than product market B. Product market A incurs more fixed overhead costs than product 
market B (1,750,000 versus 700,000) and overhead costs also increase more sharply 
with sales volume (the quadratic coefficient is 0.25 for market A versus 0.14 for market 
B). Also, the decreasing linear component is much smaller for market A than for market 
B (linear coefficient of 410 versus 515). This component offsets the lower direct cost of 
goods sold in market A (630 – 410 = 220 versus 710 – 515 = 195).  
Direct cost market A:   Ca L (F) = 630 Qa L (F)          (2a) 
Direct cost market B:  Cb L (F) = 710 Qb L (F)          (2b) 
Total direct cost:    Ctot L (F) = Ca L (F) + Cb L (F)        (2c) 
Indirect cost market A:  OHa L (F)  = 1,750,000 – 410 Qa L (F) + 0.25 Qa
2
 L (F)   (3a)
 
Indirect cost market B:   OHb L (F)  = 700,000 – 515 Qb L (F) + 0.14 Qb
2
 L (F)    (3b) 
Total indirect cost:    OHtot L (F)  = OHa L (F) + OHb L (F)        (3c)   9 
Equation (4a) shows the participants’ total profit function across both markets. Since 
prices affect demand, which in turn determines costs, profits can be entirely rewritten in 
terms of price choices. Equations (4b) and (4c) show the prices and profits in a Nash 
equilibrium for leaders and followers. We derive this via backward induction, in which 
we first determine the best response for followers (to the leader’s prices) and then given 
this strategy, we derive the optimal prices for leaders. Followers earn slightly higher 
profits than leaders in equilibrium because of their ability to move second. For profit 
maximization, participants should set a much higher price in product market A (Pa> Pb).  
Total profits:     Profittot L (F) = Qa L (F) Pa L (F) + Q b L(F) P b L (F) – Ctot L (F) – OHtot L (F)    (4a) 
Nash equilibrium leader:   Pa L  = 1,848.2; Pb L = 1,348.0; Profit tot L = 777,215.8       (4b) 
Nash equilibrium follower:   Pa F  = 1,834.4; Pb F  = 1,337.3; Profit tot F  = 790,998.0     (4c) 
 
3.2. THE MANIPULATION OF THE PRIVATE COST REPORT  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
The participants’ cost report contains sales volume, revenue, cost and profit figures 
in total and by product market. The above functions for the total amounts are used to 
update total amounts of a cost report. Hence, total profits are in fact an actual reflection 
of the participant’s performance and this figure is also publicly disclosed after each trial.  
The  cost  reports  also  use  these  functions  to  display  sales  volume,  revenues  and 
direct costs per product market. We assume, however, that only the total indirect costs 
are observable, but not the actual differences of indirect costs between the two product 
markets. Hence, to account for differences in indirect product costs, the cost reports use 
a cost allocation method to assign the total indirect cost (equation 3c) to the two product 
markets A and B. As shown in Appendix A, we manipulate the quality of the cost report 
as the extent to which the cost allocation method reflects the differences in indirect cost   10 
between the two product markets (see also Christensen and Demski [1995], Datar and 
Gupta [1994], and Gupta and King [1997]). A low-quality cost report allocates total 
indirect costs to the two markets based on sales volume and each product market gets an 
equal share of indirect costs per unit of volume. In contrast, a high-quality cost report 
assigns this total to three overhead categories. Because market A requires more of the 
cost driver, in proportion to sales volume, in each of these categories than does market 
B, this cost report more accurately reflects the differences in the indirect costs per unit.
5  
Panel A of Table 1 shows the unit costs displayed under respectively a low- or high-
quality cost report in comparison to the actual cost per unit for the initial starting prices 
(e.g. leader). Panel B of Table 1 shows our experimental design with four treatments. In 
game A both leaders and followers receive low-quality cost reports; i.e. cost allocations 
in both the leader’s and follower’s private cost report provide a distorted picture of the 
per unit costs. In game B only the leader receives a high-quality cost report that reflects 
the difference in unit costs between the two product markets. In game C only a follower 
receives a high-quality cost report. Finally in game D, both the leaders and followers 
receive high-quality cost reports with cost allocations showing that market A is per unit 
more costly than market B. In all cases, the cost report is private. Leaders are not aware 
of the cost report quality of the followers and vice versa. Prices, however, are publicly 
revealed and may contain cost information (because prices in Nash equilibrium reflect 
these cost differences). Therefore, we primarily focus on the games in which only one 
agent has a high-quality cost report (games B and C) to see if participants with a low-
quality report are able to infer information from participants with a high-quality report.  
                                                   
5 An alternative is to introduce noise on a cost figure (Callahan and Gabriel [1998]). In practice, quality of 
the cost report can be assessed in the following manner. A firm may for example learn that the typical 
volume-related cost drivers have low explanatory power compared to non-volume-related cost drivers, 
when studying their past overhead cost behavior (e.g., Banker and Johnston [1993]). The costing system 
of such a firm would be of low-quality if they still use a volume-related cost driver. The quality of the 
cost  report  is  expected  to  increase  if  non-volume-related  drivers  are  used  that  assume  that  some 
products consume more overhead than others.   11 
3.3. PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES  
We recruit 116 participants (58 pairs) from various cost accounting courses that deal 
with cost allocations and their use in pricing. Participants (mean age: 23.3 years) are 
post-graduates  who  follow  additional  programs  in  accounting,  insurance,  applied 
economics, or industrial management. When they  enter the  computer laboratory, we 
randomly assign participants to the four treatments (games A, B, C, or D) and disperse 
them widely across the computer terminals. In this way, they cannot communicate with 
one another nor can they determine with whom they are paired. All sessions have eight 
to 16 participants (four to eight pairs) and last about 90 minutes.  
We introduce the materials as a business case. Participants assume the role of price 
competitors in the distribution of portable PCs. The case informs all participants about 
the  cost  differences.  Clients  in  market  A  (PC  shops)  order  slightly  less  expensive 
products (lower cost of goods sold). Nevertheless, they require much more support than 
clients in market B (business organizations). The case also explains how the cost report 
deals with customer-related support costs. In cases of low-quality cost reports, the cost 
report is labeled as volume-based costing (VBC) which allocates indirect costs on the 
basis of sales volume.  In cases of high-quality  cost reports, we label the system  as 
activity-based costing (ABC) and participants are told that indirect costs are allocated 
on the basis of activity levels in three distinct support functions. From this description 
participants can assess the quality of their cost report (e.g., they can infer that a volume-
related driver probably does not pick up all the differences in indirect costs).  
We also describe the nature of play. Leaders set prices first because of their position 
in the market, and followers set prices after observing the leader’s prices. We mention 
that both the leader and the follower face the same cost structure for the two markets, 
and that leaders and followers distribute slightly differentiated products (e.g. different   12 
brand names of PC’s). Participants know that prices and actual total profits of their rival 
become public after each round. This forms another source of feedback. Although the 
rival’s cost report quality is private, participants are always able to compare their own 
profits with those of their rival given that costs are similar.  
Participants then review their cost report and the rival’s total profits and prices in 
product markets A and B (for the initial starting prices). They are told that feedback in 
subsequent rounds will have a similar format. Appendix B shows examples of these 
reports. Participants are instructed to maximize profits, with prices for both markets 
restricted to between €1,200 and €2,100. They are told that prices affect profits and that 
there is ample room to improve. To induce motivation, participants are informed that the 
eight best players (with the highest average profit over 10 trials) will receive a €20 gift 
coupon.
6  We  further  note  that  the  prices  and  profits  of  the  participant  and  their 
competitor for the previous five trials are always available on the screen. Participants 
then perform 10 rounds of pricing decisions. In each round, the leader sets prices for 
markets A and B (followers receive a message to wait). Next, we show these prices to 
the follower, who then decides on prices (leaders are instructed to wait). Markets clear 
and both players receive an update of their private cost report and the rival’s total profits 
and prices in markets A and B. The experiment ends with an exit-questionnaire.   
 
3.4. MANIPULATION CHECKS 
We perform an ex-post test to assess subjects’ perceptions of the quality of their cost 
reports. We use two five-point Likert-scale items of the exit questionnaire, with a score 
                                                   
6 Consistent with McIntyre and Ryans [1983], the best-performing leader and follower in each treatment 
receive a coupon. Drawbacks of this tournament scheme are the dysfunctional effects (low motivation, 
risky decisions) that may arise among participants scoring low profits in certain trials (Bonner et al. 
[2004]). Drago and Heywood [1991] empirically tested this claim and did not find evidence of such 
suboptimal behavior. We
 also presume that our reward scheme
 has little effect on
 our results. Motivation, 
as assessed in the exit questionnaire, was high (4.3 on a 5-point Likert scale) and importantly, it did not 
differ across treatments. Participants are also instructed to perform as well as possible in every trial.      13 
of 1 indicating “strongly disagree” and a score of 5 indicating “strongly agree.” The two 
items are (1) “I had a feeling that the per unit costs in the cost report were highly 
distorted” and (2) “The cost report provided me a clear picture about which market was 
more costly”. Leaders with high-quality reports scored lower than leaders with low-
quality reports on item 1 and higher than leaders with low-quality reports on item 2 
(item 1: Fquality = 5.75,
 p < 0.02; item 2: Fquality =10.74, p < 0.01, where Fquality is the F-
value of an ANOVA analysis for the effect of report quality). For followers, we observe 
a similar difference (item 1: Fquality = 4.01, p < 0.06; item 2: Fquality = 13.25,
 p < 0.01). 
We then compute score differences between leaders and followers on both these items 
to derive a scale for the perceived quality differences (Cronbach’s α = 0.615).
7 In game 
B, where only leaders have high-quality reports, leaders rate the quality of their cost 
report  higher  than  followers,  as  the  score  on  the  scale  is  positive  and  significantly 
different from zero (t = 2.07; p< 0.06). In game C, where only followers have high-
quality reports, the score is negative and significantly different from zero (t
 =
 –2.14; p < 
0.06), indicating that leaders rate the quality of their cost report lower than followers. In 
games A or D, where both leaders and followers have reports of similar quality, the 
quality is judged equally low or high (tests for scores different from zero in game A: t = 
–0.28, p > 0.78; in game D: t = 0.34, p > 0.74). In sum, the participants’ views in each 
game are consistent with the way we manipulate cost report quality in each game.  
Further tests also reveal that participants understand that followers have a second-
mover advantage. Leaders record higher scores than followers (Frole: 64.53,
 p < 0.01) on 
the item “For my competitor, it was easier to determine selling prices.” Subjects acting 
as a leader agree with this item (t-test of score different from 3, t = 9.51,
 p < 0.01), 
whereas followers disagree (t-test of score different from 3, t
 =
 – 2.74, p < 0.01).  
                                                   
7 We reverse-code the first item as it was framed in the opposite way to the second item.   14 
4. Experimental results 
We first provide the hypotheses tests for the prediction that there is more information 
leakage when only the leader rather than the follower is given a high-quality cost report. 
Section 4.1 explores this by studying differences in the leader’s and follower’s realized 
profit across treatments. Section 4.2 then compares the averages of the participants’ 
price difference between the product markets A and B across treatments. If participants’ 
prices are far apart (Pa > Pb; consistent with the price differences at Nash in equations 
4b and 4c), prices better reflect the differences in indirect unit costs between the two 
product markets. Results in both these sections use game-by-game comparisons (e.g. 
Bloomfield [1997]) on the basis of contrast estimates in an ANOVA analysis. These 
estimates show a degree of difference between treatments and provide an indication of 
economic significance. Each difference can in fact be seen as a euro difference, given 
that the experiment displays figures in euros to the participants. Further analyses in 
section 4.3 provide evidence on the underlying motivations of our findings.  
 
4.1. ANALYSES OF REALIZED PROFIT 
<Insert Table 2 about here > 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the average realized profit for the 10 rounds of play for 
participants  acting  as  a  leader  or  a  follower.  The  market  profit  is  the  sum  of  both 
participants’ profits. This panel also contains the detailed comparison of differences in 
realized profits across treatments. Panel B shows a graph of the realized profits.  
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the interaction between report quality of the leader 
and report quality of the follower in Panel A of Table 2 is significant for the followers’ 
realized profit (-81,106, p=0.06). This means that providing the follower with a high-  15 
quality report, improves the follower’s profits less when the leader already has a report 
of high-quality. This is also clear from the graph in panel B. This implies that followers 
with a low-quality cost report are able to infer information for profit improvement from 
a leader that is given a high-quality cost report. As indicated in Panel A, this interaction 
is not significant for leader’s profit (-37,955, p = 0.23). Consistent with hypothesis 2, 
the graph in Panel B shows that for the leader’s profit, only the leader’s type of cost 
report is important, regardless the type of cost report of the follower.  
Further evidence suggests that more cost information leaks out to followers (for 
profit improvement) when leaders have a high-quality cost report relative to the amount 
of information that leaks out to leaders when followers have a high-quality cost report. 
To  this  end,  we  compare  in  panel  A  of  Table  2,  the  treatments  in  which  only  one 
participant has a high-quality cost report (games B or C) to the benchmarks where both 
participants have cost reports of the same quality (games A and D).  
In comparison to the case in which both participants have low-quality cost reports 
(game A), providing only the leader with a high-quality cost report (game B) sharply 
increases market profits with +206,475 (p< 0.01), because the profits of all participants 
increase (leaders +90,266, p < 0.01; followers +116,208, p< 0.01). This result in game 
B is also signal efficient with respect to the quality of the cost report because realized 
profits do not differ from game D in which both players have high-quality cost reports 
(leaders: –23,832, p = 0.25; followers: +5,728, p = 0.44; market: –18,104, p= 0.40). In 
contrast, when only a follower receives a high-quality report (game C), market profits 
only increase with +100,959 (p = 0.08) relative to game A. Only followers improve 
their  profits  (+86,834,  p  =  0.01).  Leaders  do  not  significantly  improve  in  profits 
(+14,124, p= 0.35). This market is also less efficient with respect to the cost signal, as   16 
the leaders’ profits remain lower than in game D in which both players have high-
quality cost reports (comparison for leaders’ profit: +52,311, p = 0.08).  
Finally, when we focus on the games in which only one player has a high-quality 
cost report (comparison of games B and C, results not shown in panel A of Table 2), the 
follower’s profit is similar when either the leader or the follower has a high-quality cost 
report (difference in followers’ profit: –29,374, p = 0.22). However, compared to game 
B, the leaders’ profit is significantly lower in game C in which only the follower uses a 
high-quality report (–76,143, p = 0.02) as are market profits (–105,517, p= 0.07). The 
fact that leaders’ and market profits are lower, confirms that there is less information 
leakage when a follower uses a high-quality cost report. 
 
4.2. ANALYSES OF PRICE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRODUCT MARKETS 
Panels A and B of Table 3 show the average price differences between markets A 
and B for participants acting as leaders (Pa L - Pb L), and followers (Pa F - Pb F). A positive 
and larger price difference implies that participants’ prices better reflect the differences 
in overhead or indirect costs between the two product markets.  
<Insert Table 3 about here>  
Unlike the evidence on profits, the interaction between report quality of the leader 
and report quality of the follower in Panel A of Table 3 is never significant ( -29.0, p = 
0.69 for followers; +27.9, p = 0.67 for leaders). This can be explained by the fact that 
price  differences  are  large  when  both  players  are  given  high-quality  cost  reports  in 
comparison to the other treatments. Nevertheless, further evidence still corroborates that 
there is more information leakage from leaders than from followers.    17 
First, when we again contrast games B and C (results of this comparison not shown 
in panel A of Table 3), followers with a low-quality cost report (facing a leader with a 
high-quality report) have similar price differences than when they use a high-quality 
cost report (and face a leader with a low-quality report). Price differences for followers 
between games B and C are not significant (+44.2; p
 =0.38). This implies that a follower 
with a low-quality cost report (in game B) can infer some information from a leader’s 
prices. This is not the case for a leader with a low-quality cost report: the leader’s price 
difference is significantly lower in game C than in game B (–112.2, p = 0.02).  
Second, Table 3 further shows that when only the leader is given a high-quality cost 
report (game B) price differences for both the leader (+169.9, p< 0.01) and the follower 
(+157.0, p< 0.01) increase relative to the game A where both players have low-quality 
reports. Signal-efficiency with respect to the high-quality cost report is nearly achieved, 
as price differences for both the leader and the follower in game B are only marginally 
different  from  the  benchmark  (game  D)  where  all  players  use  a  high-quality  report 
(leaders: +85.6, p = 0.07; followers: +83.8, p = 0.10). Conversely, providing only a 
follower with a high-quality report (game C) improves the degree of price difference for 
followers but not for leaders relative to the game A where both players have low-quality 
reports (leaders: +57.7, p = 0.23; followers: +112.8, p = 0.03). Signal efficiency is also 
much lower. Price differences of the leader, but also those of the follower reflect to a 
lesser  extent  the  differences  in  overhead  costs  compared  to  game  D  in  which  both 
agents use high-quality reports (leaders: +197.8, p< 0.01; followers +128.0, p= 0.01).  
Apparently, a follower with a high-quality cost report sets smaller price differences 
between the two product markets when they face a leader with a low-quality cost report. 
We speculate that such followers conceal the fact that prices should be farther apart, and 
as a result less information leaks out to a leader with a low-quality cost report.    18 
4.3. FURTHER ANALYSES  
We first test if followers indeed conceal information, when only they use a high-
quality report. We need to rule out whether the lower price differences of a follower in 
game C stem from optimal behavior given the leader’s prices or from active deviations 
from this optimum, which would imply that followers conceal information. To this end, 
the percentage ratio in Table 4 compares the follower’s price difference in each trial to 
an optimal degree of difference using the best-response prices between the two product 
markets for that round (follower’s optimal prices given a leader’s prices for that round). 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
Given that followers have the same high-quality information in both game C and 
game D, we would not expect any difference a priori in their optimum response in each 
treatment. Results in Table 4, however, show a large difference between the followers’ 
prices in games C and D; both in the metric’s mean (50.8% vs. 27.0%, p < 0.03) and in 
improvement over trials (p < 0.06). Followers set prices at only a small percentage of 
the best-response prices and thus actively conceal their cost information when they face 
a leader with a low-quality cost report. Even more, also the difference in improvement 
over trials between game B and C is significant (p < 0.10; differences in means (36.0% 
vs. 27.0%), however, are not significant; p > 0.37). Apparently, followers with a high-
quality report (paired with a leader using a low-quality report) more slowly incorporate 
the differences in indirect costs into their prices (over multiple rounds) than followers 
with low-quality cost reports who face leaders with high-quality cost reports.
8  
                                                   
8 Consistent with information leakage, the level of price difference in relation to the difference in best-
response prices in game B does not differ from the level achieved in game D where all players use high-
quality cost reports (36.0% vs. 50.8%; p>0.11 for difference in mean and p>0.40 for improvement over 
trials). Also note that followers in games B, C, and D always improve vis-à-vis game A where all agents 
receive low-quality reports. This is logical, given that in game A, there is little information available for 
improvement. Yet, followers with a high-quality report who face a leader with a low-quality report only 
marginally improve (game A vs. C, p>.07), which may stem from the fact that they conceal information.   19 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
Table 5 compares the follower’s prices and profits against those of the leader in the 
treatments where only the leader (game B) or the follower (game C) receives a high-
quality cost report. Consistent with the discussion in section 2, we expect no differences 
between leaders and followers when only the leader is given a high-quality cost report. 
Followers will then infer information from the leader’s prices (information leakage) and 
imitate the price choices of their leader. When only the follower is given a high-quality 
cost report, we expect the follower’s price differences and profits to be larger than those 
of the leader. This would imply that followers try to take advantage of a leader.  
Evidence in Table 5 is consistent with this. When only the leader uses a high-quality 
cost report (Game B), we find no significant differences between leaders and followers 
in terms of price differences (+148.3 for followers vs. +156.5 for leaders, difference is 
-8.2; p>0.57) and profits (649,401 vs. 647,018; difference is +2,383; p > 0.88).  
When only the follower is given a high-quality cost report (game C), a follower 
charges on average larger price differences between the two product markets than their 
leader (+104.3 for followers; for leaders it is only +44.3; difference is +59.8; p<0.05). 
As such, a follower realizes higher profits at the expense of the leader’s profit (620,027 
vs. 570,875; difference is +49,152, p<0.02). As discussed in section 2, followers cannot 
be sure that leaders will change their prices at all. As a form of retaliation, leaders may 
maintain the same prices for the two product markets (consistent with their low-quality 
cost report). We indeed find evidence that a leader on average sets similar prices for the 
two product markets. A t-test reveals that their price difference between markets A and 
B (+44.3, p>0.12) is not significantly different from zero.    20 
This may explain why followers conceal part of their cost information (as shown in 
Table 4). If followers slowly incorporate the differences in overhead costs into their 
prices (and exploit leaders to a lesser extent), leaders may be inclined to change prices 
in future rounds. An alternative explanation is that followers sometimes deviate by also 
setting similar prices (so that everyone ends up with very low profits) to force leaders to 
set different prices for the two product markets in future rounds. Although followers 
conceal cost information, possibly to take advantage of leaders using a low-quality cost 
report, additional analysis shows that such followers still earn lower profits (because 
leaders retaliate by setting similar prices for the two product markets) than followers 
with a low-quality cost report facing a leader with a high-quality report.
9   
 
5. Conclusion 
Many firms compete on the basis of private information with access to some public 
signals (e.g., prices and realized profits) of other players (Dolbear et al. [1968]). Yet, no 
prior study has disentangled how private cost reports of differing quality (i.e., reports 
that use cost allocations which either reflect or do not reflect the variations in indirect 
costs) affect outcomes in these markets. We create a laboratory experiment, using a 
sequential duopoly in which a leader and follower set prices in two markets that vary in 
terms of indirect costs. Our findings suggest that participants’ profits and prices are 
sensitive to their access to low- or high-quality cost reports.  
We  show  that  high-quality  cost  reports  can  improve  profits  because participants 
appropriately  set  different  prices  for  markets  that  have  different  indirect  costs.  The 
                                                   
9 We find evidence consistent with this when we filter out the pairs in each treatment where followers 
understand that market A requires higher prices than market B; in other words those pairs for which the 
number of rounds with positive price differences for the follower is higher than the mean number of 
rounds with positive price differences for the follower (in total 10 pairs in Game B and 9 pairs in game 
C). If we test for differences in the follower’s realized profits between these games (650,174 in game C 
vs. 709,430 in game B = –59,256, t-value: –1.85, p = 0.08) we observe that followers with a high-
quality cost report facing a leader with a low-quality cost report (game C) end up with lower profits.    21 
results  also  reveal  that  less  cost  information  leaks  out  to  the  other  participant  (as 
indicated by lower price differences between the two markets) when only the follower 
and not the leader has a high-quality cost report. Signal efficiency is thus lower as all 
players adjust prices less, and the leader’s profits are lower compared to the case in 
which all players are given a high-quality cost report. These results offer important new 
insights  on  whether  accounting-related  pricing  errors  can  persist  in  markets  where 
players act on different cost information (e.g., Bloomfield and Luft [2006], Kachelmeier 
[1996], Libby et al. [2002], Waller et al. [1999]). We show that such errors persist, in 
terms of prices that do not (fully) reflect differences in indirect costs, when only the 
follower  has  a  high-quality  cost  report.  Such  followers  conceal  cost  information, 
possibly to take advantage of leaders with low-quality cost reports. As a result, prices 
differ less between the two product markets (and errors persist). Conversely, pricing 
errors quickly disappear when leaders have high-quality cost reports as cost information 
leaks out via the leaders’ prices to followers using a low-quality cost report.  
Our findings suggest several avenues for further research. In contrast to Bloomfield 
and Luft [2006], who study the factors that make it more difficult for participants (that 
use cost estimates containing error) to learn from other market participants, we show 
that the way agents compete (e.g., concealing information as a result of exploitation and 
retaliation) can also affect market outcomes. It is interesting to investigate whether such 
considerations disappear or become more apparent when we introduce other changes in 
a market. Future work could vary the number of market agents (Lundholm [1991]), the 
severity of the competition (e.g., Waller et al. [1991]), or ways in which agents interact 
(Kübler and Müller [2002], e.g., fixed pairs or random matching).  
Second, we study the conditions under which prices reflect or fail to incorporate 
private cost signals when prices are disclosed to participants. A next step is to consider   22 
games in which participants have discretion over whether or not to disclose the price 
signal  with  noise  (Callahan  and  Gabriel  [1998])  or  to  disclose  this  signal  at  all 
(Darrough [1993]). This literature also focuses heavily on simultaneous moves (Cournot 
or  Bertrand  competitions).  Using  our  insights,  one  may  explore  whether  disclosure 
incentives (Bushman [1991]) vary conditional upon the distribution of cost signals in 
markets where players move sequentially.  
In  contrast  to  the  claim  that  firms  can  earn  more  profits  relative  to  their  rivals 
(Kaplan and Cooper [1998]) when they use a more accurate cost reports, we show that 
this argument does not hold when the leader is given a high-quality report because all 
players improve in profits. Also, we contest the view that firms always benefit from 
more accurate cost information (Vives [1990]). Although followers with a high-quality 
cost report outperform leaders with a low-quality report, they suffer in that outcomes are 
inferior to those achieved when only the leader is given a high-quality report. Many 
additional insights may arise when the participants themselves can decide to invest in 
higher-quality cost information (Lundholm [1991b]). Followers might be less willing to 
spend money on this when their leader already possesses a high-quality cost report. 
Future empirical work can explore which firms invest in cost systems that better capture 
the differences in overhead cost and how this decision depends on their market position. 
 
APPENDIX A  
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TABLE 1 
Overview of the experimental design 
 
Participants act either as leader (first mover) or follower (second mover) and set prices for the two product 
markets that have different indirect costs. After each round, total profits and prices per product market are 
made public and participants receive an updated private cost report. Given the assumption that indirect costs 
per product market (equations 3a and 3b) are unobservable, the cost reports use a cost allocation method (see 
appendix A) to account for differences in the indirect costs per product market. We manipulate these cost 
reports as either having low quality (where product markets receive per unit of volume an equal amount of 
indirect costs) or high quality (where product market A is shown to be more costly than market B) in a fully 
crossed 2x2 design. Panel A shows the unit costs that are shown under a low- or high- quality cost reports in 
comparison to the actual costs at the start of the experiment (e.g. for the leader using the initial prices Pa 
L=1650; Pb L=1710; Pa F =1645; Pb F=1706). Panel B shows our experimental treatments.  
 
Panel A: unit cost shown in a high- or low-quality report (at start) vs. actual cost 
 
 
Type of cost  
Actual Cost  
Market A versus B 
Low-quality cost report  
Market A versus B 
High-quality cost report  
Market A versus B 
Direct cost per unit  630.0 < 710.0  630.0 < 710.0  630.0 < 710.0 
Indirect cost per unit  927.8 > 583.9 
(Equations 3a and 3b) 
847.0 = 847.0 
(Appendix A) 
956.1 > 491.8 
(Appendix A) 
Total unit cost ‘U’  1,557.8 > 1,293.9  1,477.0 < 1,557.0  1,586.1 > 1,201.8 
 
 
Panel B: overview of experimental treatments (U: unit cost reported each trial) 
 
Both agents receive low-quality cost report 
              Game A (n=14 pairs)               
Leader:    U (market A) < U (market B) 
Follower: U (market A) < U (market B) 
Only leader receives high-quality cost report 
              Game B (n=15 pairs)               
Leader:    U (market A) > U (market B) 
Follower: U (market A) < U (market B) 
Only follower receives high-quality cost report 
              Game C (n=14 pairs)               
Leader:    U (market A) < U (market B) 
Follower: U (market A) > U (market B) 
Both agents receive high-quality cost report 
             Game D (n=15 pairs)               
Leader:    U (market A) > U (market B) 
Follower: U (market A) > U (market B) 
 












































Analyses of the participants’ realized profits across the treatments 
 
Panel A shows the averages (for the 10 rounds of play) of the leaders’ and followers’ realized profits and the 
market profit (sum of profits of leaders and followers) per experimental treatment. Panel A compares these 
averages across treatments, based on contrast estimates within an ANOVA analysis (p-value, one-tailed). 
Note that the interaction shows whether the effect of providing a player with a high-quality cost report 
differs, depending on whether the other player has a low- or a high-quality cost report. A significant negative 
sign implies that the effect of providing a player with a high-quality cost report is lower, when the other 
player has already a high-quality report. To assess the economic significance of the results, each difference 
(Game A-B, A-C, B-D, C-D, and interaction) can be read as a euro difference given that the experiment used 
euro amounts. Panel B presents a graph of the average realized profits for leaders and followers. 
 
Panel A: Average realized profits and comparisons across treatments  
 
                 Both agents low quality  
   Only Leader high quality  
  effect report leader  
      Game A (n=14)     Game B (n=15)              Game A-B 
Profit Leaders      556,751.7            647,018.3    +  90,266.6 (p<0.01) 
Profit Followers         533,192.4            649,401.2    +116,208.8 (p<0.01) 
Market Profit             1,089,944.1         1,296,419.5    +206,475.4 (p<0.01) 
                               Only follower high quality  Both agents high quality 
                  Game C (n=14)       Game D (n=15)        Game C-D  
Profit Leaders       570,875.4              623,186.0     + 52,310.6 (p=0.08) 
Profit Followers          620,027.2            655,129.1     + 35,101.9 (p=0.18) 
Market Profit    1,190,902.6         1,278,315.1     + 87,412.5 (p=0.11) 
effect report follower         Game A-C                         Game B-D                   Interaction  
Profit Leaders     + 14,123.7 (p=0.35)     -23,832.3 (p=0.25)    -37,955.0 (p=0.23) 
Profit Followers       + 86,834.8 (p=0.01)     +5,727.9 (p=0.44)     -81,106.9 (p=0.06) 
Market Profit    +100,958.5 (p=0.08)    -18,104.4 (p=0.40)  -119,062.9 (p=0.12) 
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Analyses of the participants’ price difference between product markets A and B 
 
Panel A shows the average (for the 10 rounds of play) price differences between product markets A and B 
for leaders and followers in each experimental treatment. It indicates how well prices of participants reflect 
the differences in overhead costs between the two product markets. Panel A compares these averages across 
treatments, based on contrast estimates within an ANOVA analysis (p-value, two-tailed). The interaction can 
be interpreted in a similar way as described in Table 2. To assess economic significance, each difference 
(Game A-B, A-C, B-D, C-D, and interaction) can again be seen as a euro difference. Panel B presents a 
graph of the average level of price differences for leaders and followers.  
 
Panel A: Average level of price difference and comparisons across treatments  
 
                 Both agents low quality  
   Only Leader high quality  
  effect report leader 
      Game A (n=14)     Game B (n=15)              Game A-B 
Leader: Pa L -Pb L       - 13.4              156.5      + 169.9 (p<0.01) 
Follower: Pa F -Pb F         - 8.7              148.3      + 157.0 (p<0.01) 
                               Only follower high quality  Both agents high quality 
      Game C (n=14)       Game D (n=15)        Game C-D  
Leader: Pa L -Pb L         44.3                242.1       + 197.8 (p<0.01) 
Follower: Pa F -Pb F             104.1              232.1       + 128.0 (p=0.01) 
effect report follower        Game A-C                        Game B-D                    Interaction  
Leader: Pa L -Pb L    +  57.7 (p=0.23)           + 85.6 (p=0.07)       + 27.9 (p=0.67) 
Follower: Pa F -Pb F   + 112.8 (p=0.03)          + 83.8 (p=0.10)            - 29.0 (p=0.69) 
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      Followers' price difference      Mean for ten









p-value for difference in means 
[p-value for difference in improvement over trials]           










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
trial
Both agents high 
quality (game D)




Both agents low 
quality (game A)
TABLE 4 
Follower’s price difference in relation to the price difference in best response prices 
  
The percentage ratio of this table, divides the follower’s price difference for the two product markets (Pa F – 
Pb F) in each round by the difference in best response prices for the two product markets, i.e. those prices that 
maximize the follower’s profit given the leader’s price choices for that round. We only consider choices of 
followers consistent with the sign of the difference for the best response prices (a follower’s actual price in 
product market A should be higher than market B; otherwise the ratio was set to zero). The table displays the 
trial-by-trial mean (depicted in the figure), the overall mean for the 10 rounds of play, and results of repeated 
measures tests that compare differences in overall mean and across trial behavior for the treatments where at 
least one player receives a high-quality cost report. P-values are two-tailed (first line: p-value for difference 
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TABLE 5 
Follower versus leader in games where only one player uses a high-quality cost report 
 
In this table, we compare the profits (Table 3) and the level of price difference (Table 4) of leaders against 
that of followers in the games where either the leader or the follower has access to the high-quality cost 
report. The p-value (two-tailed) reported in the table stems from a t-test which tests whether the difference 
between followers and leaders is significantly different from zero. It is clear that follower’s behavior is very 
similar to that of leaders when the leader receives a high-quality cost report (game B) whereas followers take 
advantage of their leader when they receive high a high-quality cost report (game C).  
                      
  Price Difference: Pa - Pb (Table 4)        Realized Profits (Table 3)         
      Follower      Follower 
  Leader  Follower   versus leader  Leader  Follower   versus leader 
Only leader high   156.5  148.3  -8.2  647,018  649,401  2,383 
quality (game B, n=15)      (p>0.57)      (p>0.88) 
             
Only follower high   44.3  104.1  59.8  570,875  620,027  49,152 
quality (game C, n=14)      (p<0.05)      (p<0.02) 
             
   30 
2,277.25*2,521,118  1,928,815 699.3 x 2,521,118 592,302
2,277.25+699.3 2,277.25+699.3
Per unit of volume:  847.0 = 847.0
TABLE A 
Allocation method employed by a low- and high-quality cost report 
 
We give the example for the leader using the initial prices of Pa L=1650; Pb L=1710 for the leader and Pa F 
=1645; Pb F=1706  for  the  follower.  The  total  indirect  cost,  calculated  via  equation  3c,  is  then  equal  to 
2,521,118. A low-quality cost report uses sales volume (Qa and Qb, calculated via equations 1a and 1b) to 
allocate this total indirect cost to the two product markets. A high-quality cost report divides this overhead 
into three categories, which represent respectively 35%, 40% and 25% of the total indirect cost. Overhead in 
these categories are then assigned by assuming cost drivers, in which market A always uses more of the cost 
driver per unit of sales volume than market B. When we carry out the cost allocation, it is clear that a low-
quality cost report assigns the same amount of indirect costs to the two product markets per unit of volume, 
whereas a high-quality cost report shows product market A as more costly than product market B.   
 
Low-quality cost report          
Total indirect cost = 2,521,118    Cost driver market A  Cost driver market B 
      Qa:    2,277.25  Qb:   699.3 
 




High-quality cost report 
  
     
Total indirect cost = 2,521,118    Cost drivers market  A  Cost drivers market B 
Split up:   882,391.3 (35% of tot. indir. cost)  0.15 x Qa:     341.6  0.07 x Qb:     49.0 
              1,008,447.2 (40% of tot. indir. cost)  2.30 x Qa:   5237.7  1.20 x Qb:   839.2 
                630,279.5 (25% of tot. Indir. cost)  0.07 x Qa:     159.4  0.04 x Qb:     28.0 
 
 














341.6 x 882,391.3  771,790 49.0 x 882,391.3 110,601
341.6+49.0 341.6+49.0
5,237.7*1,008,477.2 869,189 839.2*1,008,477.2 139,258
5237.7+839.2 5237.7+839.2
159.4 x 630,279.5 536,191 28.0 x 630,279.5 94,088
159.4+28.0 159.4+28.0
2,177,171 343,947
Per unit of volume:  956.1 > 491.8  31 
TABLE B 
Screenshot of a private cost report and information of the other player’s profit and prices 
 
This table shows how we issue 1) the private cost reports to participants and 2) the other participant’s total 
profits and his or her prices for the two product markets. We present the example for participants acting as a 
leader at the start of the experiment (with prices PaL=1650; Pb L=1710 for the leader and Pa F =1645; Pb F=1706 
for the follower). The figures are calculated via the equations of section 3.1, and the allocation methods of 
appendix A. The example presents a low-quality cost report; figures that are different for a high-quality report 
are shown between brackets. Given the way we allocate cost, a low-quality cost report was labeled as ‘volume-
based costing (VBC)’. A high-quality cost report was labeled as ‘activity-based costing (ABC)’ because it has 
three specific overhead categories (which we label as order processing, software installations and delivery) and 
specific cost drivers in each of these categories (labeled as no. of orders, installations and deliveries).   
 
                                    Report about your  
VBC [ABC] report                     competitor 
  market A  margin  market B  margin  Total  Margin      Price market A  1645 
Price 
  1650    1710            Price market B  1706 
Sales Volume
   2277    699    2977
        Total profit  500639 
Revenues   3757463    1195803    4953266           
Cost of goods sold 
  1434668  38.2%  496503  41.5%  1931171  39.0%         
Indirect costs*
   1928815  51.3%  592302  49.5%  2521118
  50.9%         
Indirect costs*  2177171  57.9%  343947  28.8% 
           
  #  costs  #  costs             
  Order processing  341.6  771790  49.0  110601             
  Software installation  5237.7  869189  839.2  139258             
  Delivery  159.4  536191  28.0  94088             
Profits   393980  10.5%  106988  8.9%  500977
  10.1%         
Profits  145624  3.9%   355353  29.7%             
Unit cost   1477.0    1557.0               
Unit cost   1586.1     1201.8               
  * are allocated using sales volume as cost driver 
[
* #: respectively the number of orders, software installations and deliveries] 
 
 